摘要
文章讨论了网络上的计算机不执行给定的算法,而是执行最利于其主人工作的这种情况。作为这样的参与者即操纵算法的代理,算法设计者应事先确保代理的利益通过真实报告是最大的。文章引用了机制设计的概念,提出了研究该算法的框架,并将机制设计的标准工具VGC机制应用于解决最小连接问题。
This paper deals with algorithmic problems in a setting where the participants are assumed to follow their own self-interest rather than the algorithm. As such participants, agents are capable of manipulating the algorithm;the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents' interests are best served by telling truthfully. By following the notions from the field of mechanism design, a framework for studying such algorithms is suggested. The standard tools of mechanism design is applied to the minimum connection problem.
出处
《合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第11期1369-1371,共3页
Journal of Hefei University of Technology:Natural Science
基金
科技部重大基础研究专项资助项目(2001CCC02100)
关键词
机制设计
加权VGC机制
最小连接
mechanism design
weighted Viekrey-Groves-Clarke (VGC) mechanism
minimum connection