排污权交易中企业行为的微观博弈分析

Gaming Analysis for Behaviors of the Enterprises Involving Emission Trading

针对目前中国排污权交易研究中存在的盲点,通过对企业决策的博弈分析,尝试从微观行为分析的角度扩展对排污权交易理论的研究,具体讨论了排污权交易市场下影响企业决策与行为的主要影响因素,认为交易成本、污染排放权利的界定与分配、边际减排成本差异、排污权交易市场中参与企业的数量等是影响中国排污权交易制度能否有效实施的关键因素。基于这些分析的结果,认为中国在设计排污权交易政策时,有必要对初始分配方式进行充分的考虑,并通过规制市场以降低政治和市场风险,通过跨区交易,保障排污权交易市场规模、降低交易成本。

Focusing on the shortcomings of emission trading study in China, the authors analyze the gaming practice of decision making process of enterprises, to extend the studies on emission trading via micro behavior analysis. The paper identifies that transaction cost, definition and allocation of initial emission rights, differential of marginal abatement costs, numbers of enterprises involving emission trading scheme are the key elements and factors that influencing the decisions and behaviors of enterprises in China. Based on the analysis, the authors further provided policy recommendations for developing emission trading policy in China, where there should be full considerations of initial allocation of quotas, and to set up regulations to avoid the possible market and political risks identified, and to implement trans-boundary trading practice to ensure the scale of emission trading market and reducing the transaction costs.