金融脆弱性的微观视点:银行授信外部性与企业负债剩余假说

A Micro-perspective of Financial Fragility:A Hypothesis of Externalities of Bank Lending and Surplus of Enterprise Debt

银行授信具有外部性,当一家银行增加对某一企业授信时,将导致早期对该企业授信的银行出现风险敞口,承受外部性损失;从企业角度看,这种银行授信外部性损失转移为企业负债剩余,并因此导致企业最优资本结构外展,整体经济财务风险提高;企业获得初始负债剩余提升了企业履约可能性,并导致企业负债向有负债剩余的银行集中,最终这种银行授信外部性没有通过市场交易而自动消除,相反在经济体中不断积累,演化为金融危机;与其他关于金融脆弱性“内在性”这一悲观主义观点不同,本文认为,如果银行认识到授信外部性问题并因此完善授信定价机制和信贷合约,则金融脆弱性可以在一定程度上得到控制。

As a bank grants loans to an enterprise, the earlier loans to the enterprise will be exposed to a bigger risk. Therefore bank lending has some kind of externality. From the perspective of enterprise, the externality of a bank＇s loan will transfer into an enterprise＇s surplus of debts. This will cause the enterprise＇s optimal capital structure to expand, and increase its financial exposure. When an enterprise gets initial debt surplus, its ability to honor contracts will be enhanced. As this process evolves, enterprise＇s debts will be concentrated in banks with debt surplus. However, bank loans＇ externalities won＇t disappear automatically, the externalities will aggregate and transform into financial crisis. Compared with the pessimistic argument that financial fragility is inherent, the author holds that if bank loan＇s externality can be perceived, and loan pricing mechanism and loan contract can be perfected, then financial fragility can be reduced to some extent.