零售商B ertrand竞争下的供应链成本信息共享价值

Value of cost information sharing in a supply chain with Bertrand retailers

为了研究当零售商间存在竞争时的供应链信息共享价值,基于单供应商、两零售商的两层供应链中成本信息共享的模型,研究了两个零售商间存在B ertrand竞争时,零售商与供应商间的成本信息共享价值问题,分别讨论了两个零售商都共享成本信息、只有一个零售商共享成本信息和两个零售商都不共享成本信息时供应链各成员的收益。结果表明:供应商总能从成本信息共享中获益;但成本信息共享使零售商的收益减少,零售商并不能自愿地向供应商共享其成本信息;然而完全的信息共享在一些条件下可以通过一定的合同机制,即供应商向零售商付一定的费用来实现。

A two-level supply chain with one manufacturer in the upstream and two competing retailers in the downstream was used to investigate the value of information sharing in a supply chain with competing retailers. The retailers are assumed to be engaged in a Bertrand competition. The benefits to all members of the supply chain of information sharing are evaluated for no retailers sharing their cost information, only one sharing, or both sharing their information. The results show that with Bertrand competition between the retailers, the manufacturer is always better off with cost information sharing but the retailers are always worse off and that no cost information will be shared with the manufacturer on a voluntary basis. The results also show that for certain conditions complete information sharing can be achieved through a side payment.