摘要
根据美国公布的档案分析,美国中央情报局从1948年至1956年对中国问题的评估和预测,虽然始终缺少直接的情报支撑,其报告也曾表现得随意性较大,但随着这一工作的制度化,报告的起草者已渐渐从对中国较为生疏隔膜,变得越来越熟悉。由于这一时期美国在中国的侦察手段单一和欠缺,情报局的评估和预测未必准确,但其报告基本上保持了一种比较客观和肯定的态度。
An analysis of the declassified American archival documents reveals that the assessments and calculations of the situation in China by the American Central Intelligence Agency from 1948 to 1956 were never supported by first-hand intelligence and sometimes showed great randomness. However, with the institutionalization of the work the report drafters, who knew little about China at first, became more and more familiar with this country. As the American means of reconnaissance against China were simplistic and insufficient during that period the Agency's assessments and calculations were not necessarily correct, but its reports were generally objective and affirmative.
出处
《中共党史研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第6期79-86,共8页
CPC History Studies