我们应当在什么意义上认识意识的能动性——对传统唯物主义认识论证明的质疑

In What Sense Should We Recognize the Dynamic Role of Consciousness?——Query on the Proofs of Traditional Materialist Epistemology

传统唯物主义对其“物质是第一性的,意识第二性的”的哲学基本观点从两个方面作了证明,即本体论证明和认识论证明。就认识论证明来说,除了同本体论证明一样犯有逻辑循环的错误以外,它还有不能正确解释所谓的意识的能动性的弊端,因而它之所谓意识的“反作用”论克服了旧唯物主义的形而上学消极、被动的反映论,也是不能成立的。意识具有远远超过传统唯物主义所估价的能动性也即它所谓的“反作用”,但是这种能动性之重大和重要,要在超越传统唯物主义所谓意识的“反作用”的新的哲学视野中才能得到准确的理解。

Traditional Materialism provides proofs to its basic philosophical viewpoint that material comes before consciousness, i.e. the ontological proof and the epistemological proof. As for the epistemological proof, besides the mistake of logical circulation, it also cannot explain the so-called dynamic role of consciousness properly. Therefore, the conclusion that its theory of the counter - action of consciousness has overcome the negative reflection theory of former metaphysics does not hold water either. Consciousness has the kind of dynamic role or so-called “counter-action” which is far beyond the estimation of traditional materialism, and its importance can only be correctly understood in a new philosophical vision.