大股东侵害与中小股东利益保护:一个模型分析

Harming Behavior of Large Shareholder and the Protection of Small Shareholder:A Model Analysis

大股东侵害中小股东利益的现象已引起社会的广泛关注,但已有文献缺乏对大股东侵害成因和程度的研究。依据公共选择理论和产业组织理论,本文模型指出实施监督职能但没有得到相应投资收益是大股东侵害中小股东利益的重要原因,大股东的侵害包括以补偿监督成本为目的的第I类侵害、要求监督成本的支出取得合理投资回报为目的的第II类侵害和大股东利用公司内部信息以最大化其收益为目的的第III类侵害,且不同类型的侵害对大股东和公司的意义不同。为有效解决大股东侵害问题,并提高大股东的监督水平,就应对大股东的第I类和第II类侵害进行补偿,并对第III类侵害进行惩罚。

The harming behavior of large shareholders to small ones has attracted public attention broadly, but the literature lacks the study on the reason and the extent of the harming. On the basis of public choice theory and industrial organization theory, the writers of this article points out that the fact that monitor has not received any investment return is the main reason of harming behavior of large shareholder. There are three types of these harming behaviors： the harming aimed at compensate the cost of monitoring, the harming aimed at getting the appropriate return for the opportunistic cost of monitoring and the harming aimed at optimal return by use of the internal information for the large shareholder. And each of them has different meaning for firms and large shareholder. In order to deal with the harming behavior of large shareholder efficiently and raise the monitor level of large shareholder, it is necessary to improve the mechanisms of compensating to the first and second types and punishing the third type.