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期权和限制性股票的行为因素比较分析 被引量:1

The Comparison between Executive Stock Option and Restricted Stock on Behavioral Factors
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摘要 本文从行为因素的角度对期权和限制性股票的长期激励效果进行比较,发现期权在三个方面表现不如限制性股票,一是对期权的成本被激励对象会比激励者考虑的更大;二是期权失去了股票分红所产生的长期激励效果;三是期权的行权价的存在使被激励对象和激励者之间的正互惠关系丧失。因此,在长期激励的工具选择上,限制性股票与期权相比具有行为上的优势。 This thesis compare executive stock option and restricted stock from the perspective of behavioral factors, We find option has three shortages, First option has a bigger psychological cost to agent than principle's anticipation. Second, option loses the long term incentive benefits which come from dividends. Third, option can not foster a positive reciprocity relation between principle and agent, So we draw a conclusion that restricted stock has behavioral advantages than option when we select long term tools.
出处 《预测》 CSSCI 2005年第6期32-36,共5页 Forecasting
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371036) 博士点基金资助项目(20020698043)
关键词 长期激励 期权 限制性股票 行为因素 long term incentive executive stock option restricted stock behavioral factor
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参考文献23

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同被引文献29

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