从地方政府经济行为角度谈绩效评价机制设计

On the Mechanism Designing of Performance Evaluation from the View of Local Government Economic Behavior

相对于中央政府，地方政府的从属地位决定了其经济行为取向受制于中央的政策期望和评价激励机制。不同时期的中央政策期望和评价机制决定了地方政府经济行为的不同特征。当前中央政府对地方政府评价制度的不完善，导致了宏观经济政策微观力量的缺失和负面外部效应的不断累积，建设完善的绩效评价机制是当务之急。

Relatively speaking, the subordinate status of local government indicates that its economic behavior is confined by the policy expectation and mechanism of performance evaluation of central government, which decides the different characteristics of local government economic behavior in different times. Recently, the performance evaluation system of local government is imperfect and brings many negative results, such as the lack of micro power of the macro economy policy and the accumulation of the negative outside effect. It is an imminent task to build up a perfect mechanism of performance evaluation.