期刊文献+

上市公司高管人员股权激励研究——十论社会主义条件下的股份制度 被引量:24

A Research On Executives' Equity Incentive Of China's Listed Companies
原文传递
导出
摘要 在现代公司管理中,董事长、董事、总经理、副总经理及其他高管人员起着举足轻重乃至决定性作用。深入探讨各种股权激励的理论与实务,对如何调动高管人员积极性和如何约束他们的行为就显得极其重要。我国上市公司在积极进行相关改革的过程中,高管人员薪酬改革却相对滞后了。应当对中国上市公司高管人员实施直接持股、股票期权计划和管理层收购等股权激励方案,并同时应充分考虑股权激励相关的制度风险和市场风险,采取一些必要措施防范股权激励风险。 In contemporary corporate management, board chairman, director, CEO, vice general manager and otherexecutives play a crucial and even decisive role. How to motivate and importance. Cao Fengqi explores a variety of theories and applications in discusses the necessity of applying equity incentive to executives in China's incentive application, and the issue of risk prevention with regard to equity constrain the executives is of critical relation to equity incentive. Cao also listed companies, a plan of the equity incentive.
作者 曹凤岐
出处 《北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第6期139-150,共12页 Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词 上市公司 高管人员 股权激励 风险防范 listed companies executives equity incentive risk prevention
  • 相关文献

参考文献21

  • 1JENSEN, MICHAEL C. and MURPHY, KEVIN J.Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives [ J],Journal of Political Economy, Vol.98, No. 21, 1990:225 - 264.
  • 2HALL, BRIAN J., and LIEBMAN, JEFFREY B. Are Ceos Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? [J] .The Quarterly Journal of lEcomomics, Vol. CXIII, Issue 3, 1998:653-691.
  • 3DEMSKI, JOEL S. and DAVID SAPPINGTON. Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 33, 1984:152- 171.
  • 4ITOH, HIDESHI. Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations[J]. Econometrica 59, 1991:611 - 637.
  • 5BALDER, ERIK J. On the ExistenceContract Mechanisms for Incompleteof Optimal Information Principal-Agent Models[J] . Journal of Economic Theory 68, 1993:133- 148.
  • 6LAZEAR, EDWARD P. and ROSEN, Sherwin. Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts [J].Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No.5, 1981 :841 - 864.
  • 7HOLMSTROM, BEGNT and MILGROM, Paul. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses : Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design [ J ]. Journal of Law,Economics and Organization, Vol. 7 (Spring), 1991 :24 - 52.
  • 8BECK, PAUL J., and ZORN, THOMAS S. Managerial Incentives in a Stock Market Economy [J]. The Journal of Finance, Vol.XXXVII, No. 5, 1982:1151- 1167.
  • 9YERMACK, DAVID. Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively? [ J ]. Journal of Financial Economics, 39,1995:237 - 269.
  • 10GUAY, WAYNE R. The Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to Equity Risk: an Analysis of the Magnitude and Determinants [ J ], Journal of Financial Economies,53, 1999:43- 71.

二级参考文献25

  • 1钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革[J].经济研究,1995,30(1):20-29. 被引量:264
  • 2张胜荣.看不见的资源与现代企业制度[J].经济研究,1995,30(10):41-47. 被引量:12
  • 3张维迎.所有制、治理结构及委托—代理关系———兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点[J].经济研究,1996,31(9):3-15. 被引量:1542
  • 4[1]Baker,G.P.,M.C.Jensen and K.J.Murphy,1988,Compensation and incentives:practices vs theory.Journal of Finance,43(3).
  • 5[2]Barro,J.R.and Barro,R.J.,1990,Pay,Performance and turnover of bank CEOs,Journal of Labor Economics 8(3).
  • 6[3]Conyon,M.C.,1994a,“Corporate government and exeutive compensation”,International Journal of Industrial Organization.
  • 7[4]Conyon,M.C.,1994b.“Corporate government change in UK companies between 1988 and 1993”,Corporate Government:An International Review 2:87~99.
  • 8[5]Conyon,M.,Gregg,P.And S.Machin,1995,“Taking are of business:executive compensation in the United Kingdom”,The Economic Journal 105(May):704~14.
  • 9[6]Gibbons,R.and K.J.Murphy,1990,Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers,Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43(3).
  • 10[7]Hallock,K.F.,1997,“Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation”,Journal of Finance and Quantitatives Analysis,32(3).

共引文献2020

同被引文献134

引证文献24

二级引证文献53

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部