道路收费政策下的博弈分析

Road charge policy take off Rich Yi analyses

随着城市汽车保有量的增加,城市交通变得越来越拥挤。该文通过对不同的道路实行道路拥挤收费,通过收费方案来探讨道路拥挤收费和路径选择的模型的建立,即在最大社会收益的情况下来分析收费方案和道路出行者的关系。同时通过博弈论来分析道路出行者对时间价值、道路收费的关系。该文讨论了垄断博弈、斯坦尔伯格博弈、库罗特博弈来分析道路管理者、道路出行者之间的博弈行为,并且得出最佳的收费方案,分析结果表明,斯坦尔伯格博弈下的收费方案能更好的扩大社会收益,并且有效的减少了道路的交通流量。

As the number of automobile of city is increasing, city traffic becomes more and more crowded. This paper carries out road crowded charge for the road of difference, discusses the model of route option and road crowded charge through charge scheme establish, in the condition of biggest social profit analyses charge scheme and road is all right the relation of. At the same time comes to analyse road through game theory is all right collect fees for time value and road concern. This paper have discussed monopoly rich Yi, this level Er uncle shelf rich Yi, storehouse Luo Te Bo Yi to analyses road manager and road is all right between rich Yi behavior, and reach the charge scheme of the best. Analysis result show： this level Er uncle shelf rich Yi take off collect fees scheme can enlarge social profit, and effectively reduced the traffic rate of flow of road.