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集合竞价过程中信息揭示的理论分析 被引量:6

An Theoretical Analysis on the Information Disclosure in the Process of Call Auction
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摘要 基于异质交易者假设,讨论了知情交易者和非知情交易者在集合竞价过程中的策略行为;分析了集合竞价过程中引入指示性价格揭示和公开限价指令簿信息对于集合竞价定价效率的影响;最后给出了该文结论的现实意义,并提出了相应的政策建议。 Based on the hypothesis of heterogeneous traders, this paper analyzes the strategic behaviors of informed traders and uninformed traders during the process of call auction, and discusses the impact of indicator price information disclosure and public limit order book on the call auction process. At last we discuss the practical implication and policy suggestion.
出处 《电子科技大学学报》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2005年第6期861-864,共4页 Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70441021)
关键词 市场微观结构 集合竞价 信息揭示 交易者 market microstructure call auction information disclosure trader
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参考文献4

  • 1Madhavan A. Trading mechanisms in securities markets[J]. Journal of Finance, 1992, 2(2): 607-641.
  • 2Comerton-Forde C. Do trading rules impact on market efficiency? A comparison of opening procedures on Australian and Jakarta stock exchanges[J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 1999, (7): 495-521.
  • 3Stoll H. The stock exchange specialist system: an economic analysis[M]. New York: Monograph Series in Finance and Economics, 1985,Vol. 2, Salomon Brothers Center, New York University, 1985.
  • 4Madhavan A. Security prices and market transparency[J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1996,(5): 255-283.

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