摘要
该文利用利益集团理论对承包制—股份制这一制度变迁过程进行了分析,具体考察了这一过程中各利益集团关于新制度的预期效用,以及由此它们对这一制度变迁所施加的影响,从而揭示这一制度变迁过程产生的根本原因:在1992年之前,承包制是各利益集团一致的选择。1992—1996年地方政府和国有企业偏好于股份制,而中央政府从最大化其风险规避的预期效用的角度出发,并不偏好股份制。但因为地方政府和国有企业组成了利益集团联盟,中央政府在信息与权力、财力上都处于劣势,所以最终股份制取代了承包制,成为国有企业改革的方向。
The paper uses theory on interest group to analyse the course from contract institution to stock institution. The author specificly examines all kinds of interest groups' expectation on new institution in the period above and their effects on institional change so as to reveal the foundational reason resulting in this change. Prior to 1992, contract institution was the common choice of all interest groups; and from 1992 to 1996, both local government and state-owned enterprises preferred to stock institution, while the central government didn't do so from the view of maximizing her ecpectational utility of avoiding risks. But because local government and state-owned enterprises had formed an association of interest groups, which disadvantaged the central government in most aspects such as information, power, and finance etc. , stock institution took the place of contract instition at last.
出处
《财经问题研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第12期3-9,共7页
Research On Financial and Economic Issues
关键词
利益集团
制度变迁
承包制
股份制
国有企业
interest group
institutional change
contract institution
stock institution
stateowned enterprises