业主维权运动:产生原因及动员机制——对北京市几个小区个案的考查

Beijing House Owners' Rights Protection Movement:Reason of Breakout and Mobilization Mechanism

本文采用社会运动理论中的资源动员、政治过程理论和利益集团理论研究中国城市的业主维权运动。笔者将宏观的利益集团社会政治视角与中、微观的维权运动动员机制结合起来,考察影响业主维权运动的主要因素。笔者在北京市小区维权案例中发现,在房地产开发和物业管理领域,以开发商和物业公司为主体,包括房管局小区办、地方法院和街道办事处等相关政府部门和政府官员在内的、一个具有分利性质的房地产商利益集团已经形成。该集团的强势地位,使开发商和物业公司敢于普遍而广泛地侵害广大业主的合法权益,这正是业主维权运动兴起的深层原因。维权骨干和积极分子的领导、业委会的建立、业委会的有效动员、适当的策略、业主丰富的资源,是业主组织起来,击败房地产商利益集团,取得维权胜利的核心因素;这五个因素构成了业主成功维权的中、微观动员机制。

The rights protection movement of house owners is rising in urban China. This paper analyzes six cases of the rights protection movement in Beijing. The author finds that a new Real Estate Interest Group has formed in urban China. The superior position of the Real Estate Interest Group makes developers and property management companies easily infringe on house owners' rights. In order to achieve successes in the rights protection movement, house owners have to organize to immobilize the Real Estate Interest Group. Core members and activists, organization, mobilization, strategies, and resources constitute the micro-and medi-mobilization mechanism of successful rights protection movements. Interest groups model, instead of other models, helps to interpret the new community politics in urban China.