转型期国有商业银行的软预算约束

The Soft Budget Constraint of State-owned Commercial Banks in the Process of Transition

我国国有银行在转型过程中依然保持着软预算约束,并没有建立消除大量不良贷款产生的机制。商业银行软预算约束并不是转型经济面临的特殊现象,但是我国国有商业银行的软预算约束则呈现出自身的特点和特殊的形成机理。软预算约束使银行行为发生扭曲,增加了财政负担,降低了货币政策的调控效率、中央银行的独立性和整个金融体系的稳定性,进而牵制了我国金融市场化改革进程,阻碍金融市场准入和利率的市场化。在政策取向上,国有商业银行改革应使股份制改造与商业化并行,改革的渐进性要求采取逐步引进外资参股、逐步降低信用集中度和逐步实现利率市场化的道路。

The state - owned commercial banks maintain the soft budget constraint （SBC） and do not establish the mechanisms to remove the unhealthy loan in the process of transition. The SBC of China＇s state- owned commercial banks not only has its own characteristics and occurring mechanisms but also exert great influences in banking system, public finance, monetary policy, and financial market. The reform of China＇ s state - owned commercial banks in system is an evolutionary process, which includes es- tablishing the shareholding system and market - oriented operation.