摘要
中国的融资制度经过了20多年的改革,由原来的不涉及既有主体利益的增量改革、边际改革逐步向涉及既有集团利益的存量改革深化,融资制度的改革已经进入利益调整阶段。这一阶段,各主体在融资制度变迁问题上,动力并不完全一致:国家作为融资制度变迁的主导者,改革动力的大小取决于政府对融资制度改革的收益与风险的判断;地方政府、其他微观主体和各级代理人的动力存在不足现象。多种力量博弈所达到的均衡状态影响着融资制度变迁。
Through over two decades of reform, China's financing system has gradually entered the phase of interest adjustment, developing from increment reform and marginal reform not concerning vested principal interest to preservation reform concerning vested group interest. In this phase, various principals' motives on financing system evolution are not consistent. The state is the dominator of financing system evolution. The reform motive depends upon the government's judgment of the revenue and risk of financing system reform. The motive of local governments, other microprincipals, and different levels of procurators deserves on imagination. The equilibrium, as the result of gaming among many forces, will influence the financing system evolution.
出处
《金融理论与实践》
北大核心
2005年第12期14-16,共3页
Financial Theory and Practice
关键词
融资制度
制度变迁
经济转型
金融企业
financing system
system evolution
economy transformation
financial enterprises