企业剩余分配:一种以经济权力为状态依存特征的动态均衡——兼论控制权控制和完善上市公司治理结构

The Distribution of the Enterprise Surplus:the Dynamic Equilibrium on the Characteristic of State-Contingent Economic Power

本文基于Nash讨价还价模型,引入经济权力概念,扩展了双人讨价还价模型和利益保护机制设计。指出在个体经济权力禀赋差异下,经济权力特性和自我强化功能决定了以经济权力状态依存特征的企业剩余分配过程,即经济权力大,个体获取的企业剩余分配比例就大,并随经济权力作用而得到强化。因此,要实现对弱势群体的利益保护,应赋予其足以制衡强权主体的经济权力。若经济权力用于代理人激励约束,委托主体的奖惩和承诺对代理人而言是可信的,就可实现企业效率和利益保护的双重功能。

The paper introduces the economic power and expands the bargaining model and designs the mechanism of the interest protection based on the Nashbargaining model It indicates that the enterprise surplus is state - contingent economic power, and that the greater the economic power is, the more surplus the individual will get. So, to protect the interest of the infirmness people, it should endow them with more economic power. If they will use to constraint the agent, all they do can be trusted by the agent, and will realize the dual function of promoting the enterprise efficiency and the interest protection.