摘要
本文着眼于反洗钱体系建立与运行中存在效率较低的现实,在重新界定了反洗钱各方经济主体的利益关系的基础上,指出了反洗钱斗争具有公共商品的特征。然后通过建立洗钱者与商业银行、中央银行与商业银行、发展中国家与发达国家的三个博弈模型进行进一步分析,从而发现了在当前利益成本无法配比的条件下,个体理性导致集体理性丧失的内在机制,并通过动态的调整分析,得出了必须通过政治谈判的方式进行利益的调整,最后得出了群体理性恢复的有效解决路径。
This paper is focused on the low efficiency existing while anti-money laundering system is established and put into operation. After the benefit relationship among all parties concerned is redefined, it is pointed out that the anti-money laundering battle looks like a public commodity. Further study, based on the three gaming models established between money launders and commercial banks, central banks and commercial banks, developing countries and developed countries, reveals that considering the incompatible interest costs at present, the loss of individual reason is responsible for the loss of collective reason. Through dynamic adjustment and analysis, it is concluded that adjustment must be made in interest distribution by way of political negotiation. Finally, an effective way to restore collective reason is proposed.
出处
《金融论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第10期52-56,共5页
Finance Forum
关键词
反洗钱
博弈
群体理性
anti-money laundering, gaming
collective reason