基于博弈分析的农村信用社产权改革路径选择

Path Selection of Rural Credit Co-Operatives in Their Ownership Reform,a Game Theory Perspective

随着我国农村信用社改革的步步深化,新型产权组织模式与运行机制的构建已经走到了攻坚阶段。文章在归纳分析农村信用社改革与发展背景及基本现状的基础上,围绕政府与农村信用社双方的益损值,对政府推行农村信用社合作制规范进行了博弈分析,由最终的纳什均衡分析结果,得出了在现有农村信用社基础上搞统一的合作制规范不切实际,农村信用社改革必须走“多元化”产权组织模式道路的结论,并就新时期如何进一步发展与完善农村信用社“多元化”产权组织模式提出了几点政策性建议。

With the deepening of rural credit co-operatives, restructuring of ownership and operation mechanism have reached the critical stage. By analyzing the development and current situation of rural credit co-operatives, the article makes a game theory analysis of the local governments and their role in standardizing the operations of rural credit co-operatives. The results of Nash equilibrium show that it is impractical to have a uniform standard for rural co-operatives. Rural co-operatives have to follow multiple patterns in their development. Policy design proposals are also made on how to further develop rural credit co-operatives under the pluralized ownership concept.