寡头垄断竞争中车险价格行为的实证研究

Experimental Study on Motor Insurance Pricing in an Oligopoly Competition Market

本文以车险费率市场化改革为背景，运用产业组织学有关寡头垄断竞争的理论，对我国产险市场结构，尤其是对最早试点的深圳车险市场变化情况和历史数据进行了实证研究，得出了三个基本判断：一是目前我国产险市场尚属于极高寡占型市场结构，二是领导者——跟随者竞争模式初步显现，三是规模导向的定价模式是造成当前车险“价格战”的最主要原因，这三个基本判断对宏观调控车险价格具有一定的参考价值。针对这种情况，我国车险定价模式要从规模导向转为战略导向，重建行业性风险费率和附加费率的车险价格体系，引导和调控领导者——跟随者竞争模式，更好地发挥稳定车险价格的作用，从而有效抑制车险恶性竞争，提高整个车险行业的盈利能力。

Cast in the background of motor insurance pricing deregulation ,this article applied the theory of oligopoly in industrial organization to analyze the market structure of China＇s property insurance,in particular the evolution and experience data of Shenzhen motor insurance market where the deregulation policy was first tried out, and comes to three basic conclusions ： firstly, the motor insurance market in China is still in the stage of absolute oligopoly; secondly, the competitive model of leaders and followers has emerged; thirdly, the focus of business volume is the main factor leading to pricing war. These three conclusions are worth being considered in regulating motor insurance price on a macro-level. The motor insurance pricing model in China should transit from being volume-oriented to strategy-oriented and the pricing system composed of risk premium rate and loading should be reconstructed. The leader-follower competitive mode should be well guided to play its role of price stabilizer in order to curb vicious competition and improve profitability of the whole motor insurance industry.