虚假会计信息产生的经济学分析——从经理人员的角度

Analysis of False Accounting Information Arising in Economics——from Managers' Angle

会计信息是企业利益相关者进行决策的重要依据,虚假会计信息将影响使用者的决策。虚假会计信息有广义和狭义之分。文章从经理人员的角度进行分析,认为委托—代理关系的存在是经理人员提供虚假会计信息的制度前提,企业所有者与经营者效用函数的不一致是经理人员提供虚假会计信息的现实基础,成本—效益原则是经理人员决定是否提供虚假会计信息的判断标准,会计政策和会计方法的可选择性,为虚假会计信息的产生提供了便利。

Accounting information is an important basis for those who are related to the enterprise interests to make decisions, thus false information that can be used in broad and narrow sense will affect its users. This paper does some analysis from the managers＇ angle, in the belief that the existence of the trust- and- agency connections is the system prerequisite, for the managers to provide false accounting information, the difference of the effectiveness functions between the company＇s owners and its operators is the realistic basis, the cost - benefit principle is the judging criteria. The altematives of the accounting policies and methods provide the arising of the false information with facilities.