G-H-M理论扩展与国有企业产权改革被引量：3

Firm Theory and Enterprise Policy G-H-M Theory Extension and Property Right Reform of State-owned Enterprises

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摘要本文通过扩展G-H-M理论,将剩余控制权区分为名义剩余控制权与实际剩余控制权,强调实际剩余控制权与剩余索取权存在高度互补性,据此分析国有企业内在机制的缺陷,一方面国有产权的实际剩余控制权与剩余索取权分离,另一方面名义剩余控制权缺乏完全性,因而国有企业的改革方向是以消除制度设计内在矛盾为目标的产权改革。

作者赵志峰

机构地区南开大学经济研究所

出处《南开经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第6期86-90,共5页 Nankai Economic Studies

关键词 G—H—M理论国有企业企业产权改革名义剩余控制权实际剩余控制权中国 Formal Residual Control Rights Real Residual Control Rights State-owned Enterprise Property Rights

分类号 F276.1 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献12

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