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我国商业银行与骇客的博弈模型

The Game Theory Model Reducing Security Risks of Chinese Commercial Banks
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摘要 运用博奕论方法分析了我国商业银行和骇客对银行网络安全系统进行攻击与防御的各种策略和行动方案,指出商业银行与骇客双方只有通过重复博弈建立起长期的博弈关系,才有可能消除商业银行的“不增加对系统安全性的投入”行为,建立起良好的商业银行注重网络系统安全性声誉,从而使整个社会网络安全得以实现。 The paper utilizes the game theory to analyze the strategies and actions about attack and defense between commercial banks & hackers. It suggests that commercial banks should play a permant game with hackers to reduce their investment for protecting the system security. This strategy can make commercial banks build up a good reputation on network system security, which, in turn, accounts for social network security.
出处 《商业研究》 北大核心 2005年第24期137-140,共4页 Commercial Research
关键词 安全风险 博弈论 骇客 security risk game theory hacker
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