Certainty-equivalence方法对经理股票期权价值的确定以及相应激励效果分析

Certainty-equivalence Model for the Value of the Executive and the Analysis of the Motive Effect

经理股票期权是一种较为先进的薪酬管理制度,但由于其本身所具有的特点,使得利用BS模型对其进行定价会偏离经理人员的人力资本,现介绍Certainty-Equivalence方法来确定ESO的价值,使其更接近人力资本。同时,利用博弈的方法确定经理股票期权数量的最佳值,分析了影响经理人员努力程度的相关因素。

Executive stock option （ESO） is regarded as one of the most advanced way to motive the executives. However, as the ESO has its own characteristics, the price of the ESO estimated by the Black-Scholes Model is always high from the real value of the ESO. By the model of Certainty-equivalence, the value of the ESO is estimated more efficiently. Based on the CE model, the optimal amount of the option holded by the executives is evaluated by Game Theory. Some related factors are analyzed to motive the executives.