欧盟共同外贸政策的制度分析——权限、机制与有效性

An Institutional Analysis Concerning Common Commercial Policy of the European Union: Competence,Institution and Effectiveness

从制度主义的研究视角出发,通过分析欧盟共同外贸政策形成过程中所涉及的三个变量——权限分配、权力结构和决策程序,来透视影响共同外贸政策制定的制度性因素。成员国与欧共体委员会之间就共同外贸政策的权限之争在历次条约改革中得到明显体现,欧盟共同外贸政策始终存在共同体权限缺失的不足,即使是在欧盟宪法条约中也没有授予共同体在外贸政策上完全独享权限。欧盟委员会仅仅是共同外贸政策的执行者和代理人,它对部长理事会及其下属机构特别是“133委员会”存在严重依赖,并受到欧洲议会和欧洲法院的牵制。部长理事会内大量使用全体一致通过的表决原则,影响着共同外贸政策的制定与执行;即便是特定多数表决方式下,由于“卢森堡妥协案”的深远历史影响,成员国往往也寻求一致通过决议。这些因素均对欧盟共同外贸政策的连贯性和有效性产生掣肘。

From an institutional perspective, the paper analyzes the three variables related to the formative process of the European Union＇s Common Commercial Policy （CCP）, namely competence distribution, power relationships and decision-making procedures, so as to identify the institutional factors having influence on mapping out the Common Commercial Policy. Fighting for competence over trade issues between the Commission and member states was clearly reflected in the changes of the EC/EU Treaties texts. Lack of Community competence has long been a shortcoming for the CCP, and even the Constitution did not authorize the Community to have exclusive competence over all areas of Common Commercial Policy. The Commission is merely an agent and implementer in CCP and seriously dependent on the Council of Ministers and its subordinate institutions, especially the so-called “133 Committee”. The European Parliament and the European Court of Justice keep at bay those on the Commission. The decision-making mechanism “unanimity” extensively adopted by the Council of Ministers has had a fairly great impact on CCP policy making and execution. Even if Qualified Majority Rule is applied, member states often will seek to pass the resolution unanimously, which is the historical legacy of the “Luxemburg Compromise”. All these factors contribute to curbing and handicapping the coherence and effectiveness of the Common Commercial Policy.