我国上市公司大股东与中小股东企业剩余分配不均衡的权力解读——兼论我国上市公司中小投资者利益保护机制

A Study of the Unequal Power of Major and Minor Shareholders in Distributing Surplus and the Protection Mechanism of Minor Investors

真实经济中存在大量的大股东利益侵占现象,本文认为,这是股东经济权 力天然非对等的必然结果。本文从放松股东为同一性质主体假定和股东间非对等经济权 力入手,建立企业剩余分配的博弈模型,推演出大股东侵占中小股东利益过程和实现机 制,指出通过控制权实现利益侵占是市场失灵的必然结果,市场机制本身无法解决。

There are many encroachments of the surplus in the real economy. This paper indicates that this is the inevitable result of unequal economic power. Relaxing the assumption that shareholders are equal in nature and considering the fact that shareholders are of unequal economic power, the paper builds the game model of firm surplus distribution and illustrates that major shareholders tend to encroach firm surplus and the mechanism of the encroachment. It is showed that the surplus encroachment is the inevitable result of market failure and cannot be resolved by market mechanism itself.