商户联盟与Hotelling竞争下支付卡交换费的比较分析

A Hotelling Model on Interchange Fees of Payment Card Compared to Commodities' Alliance

构建银行卡组织、商户与消费者的动态博弈模型研究支付卡的交换费问题.在银行卡组织垄断条件下,比较分析了商户联盟与商户进行Hotelling竞争两种市场结构下的均衡交换费;并进一步分析商户数量及银行卡组织引入竞争机制对均衡交换费的影响.基本结论对POS支付、ATM交易等网络型产业的接入定价与规划政策具有一定借鉴参考价值.

It established a dynamic game model about the payment card scheme,merchants and consumers to study the interchange fees of payment card. With a single payment card scheme, a comparative equlibrium analysis on the interchange fees is done upon two different market structures, i. e. merchants competing with each other as in a Hotelling model and merchants entering strategic alliance like a monopoly. Furthermore, the impact of the number of merchants and the competition among payment card schemes on the equilibrium of interchange fees is foreseen. The main conclusions are meaningful to the regulation of access pricing in network industries such as POS payment system and ATM transaction system.