人力资源工龄买断价格博弈分析

Analysis of Game Theory on the Price of Layoff Mechanism for Human Resource

提出了用博弈论方法处理人力资源管理中的工龄买断定价问题的新思路,阐述员工工龄买断的二种主要思路和一个充要条件.在企业与员工双方对买断估价信息不完全和采用线性战略条件下,分别讨论工龄买断非仲裁定价与仲裁定价2种不同博弈行为.研究表明:非仲裁定价博弈双方的最优战略仍是线性战略,仲裁定价博弈双方的最优战略仅是采取单一基准价格战略,员工三种收入函数的数量化是确定工龄买断定价的基础.

The new thought of using game theory to study the price of layoff mechanism for human resource management was put forward. Two main ideas on layoff mechanism and one sufficient and necessary condition of layoff mechanism were introduced. Under the conditions of imperfect information and linear stratagems for enterprise and employee, two games as non-arbitrage and arbitrage price on the layoff were discussed. The research showed that the dominant stratagems were linear on non-arbitrage game and single prices on arbitrage game for enterprise and employee. The base of the pricing of layoff mechanism is to quantitate three kinds of income functions.