摘要
从法经济学的角度分析,股东直索责任制度具有平衡功能和效益功能两大效用。前者在于股东直索责任制度可以将风险成本外在化,从而有效地遏制股东从事“坏的风险”的行为;后者在于股东直索责任制度能够降低信息不对称现象所产生的交易成本,从而促进社会总的效益的提高。我国存在各国经济发展中具有共性的滥用公司形式问题,遂使得股东直索责任制度之价值亦适宜于我国。
From the point of view of laws and economics, the rule of disregarding stockholder' limited liability has two kinds of efficacy, namely the function of balance and of benefit. The former means that this rule can exteriorize the cost of risk so as to keep stockholders' actions towards baleful risk within limits; the latter mans that it can decline transaction cost aroused by asymmetric information between stockholders and other parties. As a popular phenomena in every country more or less, there are so many problems of abusing corporate form in China. Therefore the rule of disregarding stockholder' limited liability is valuable in our nation.
出处
《上海财经大学学报》
2005年第6期52-58,共7页
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
关键词
直索责任
有限责任
公司法
法经济学
disregarding limited liability
limited liability
corporate law
law and economics