道德风险与存款保险额度的市场决定

Moral Hazard and Coverage Determined in the Deposit Insurance Market

中国建成何种存款保险制度模式将直接影响到银行行为和金融稳定。存款保险具有诱发银行从事更高风险经营的制度激励。为此,实践中许多经济体对存款保额人为设定上限。但总体上不是降低而是加大了银行体系的不稳定性。而保额如果由市场内生决定,则能够摆脱人为确定保额的困境。在金融业相对稳定的背景下,中国存款保险制度建设应该发挥后发优势,利用市场决定保额以尽量增加市场约束力。而且操作上也较为简单易行,并可与其他金融改革和制度建设互动进行。

Deposit insurance scheme （DIS）set up in China will directly influence bank behaviours and financial stability. Incentive for banks to choose riskier asset portfolios does exist in DIS. In practice, coverage is set up in many economies to reduce moral hazard. Because of its shortfalls, DIS leads to higher rather than lower banking system instability. A new DIS,which coverage is determined by the market equilibrium between demand and supply,can help go out dilemmas led by artificial coverage. Under the background of financial relative stabilization, advantages of coverage determined in market in DIS should be taken to increase market discipline in China which should have post-development advantages. Furthermore,the new DIS is easily feasible and practice with other financial reforms and institutional constructions.