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罗伯特·奥曼和托马斯·谢林的贡献——2005年诺贝尔经济学奖述评 被引量:1

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摘要 罗伯特.奥曼和托马斯.谢林是2005年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者。奥曼的主要贡献包括:发展了重复博弈理论、对合作博弈中“核”解与经济一般竞争性均衡间等价性的证明以及提出“谈判集”作为合作博弈的解等。谢林所提出的诸如冲突、承诺、协调等重要概念,为促进早期博弈论理论体系的发展完善起到了重要的推动作用,为推动博弈论在实践中的广泛运用所作出了重要贡献。
作者 程凌
出处 《经济评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第1期64-69,共6页 Economic Review
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参考文献15

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同被引文献10

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  • 10叶永玲.虚拟经营的竞合博弈及合作动力分析[J].管理科学,2003,16(5):2-5. 被引量:14

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