需求价格敏感情况下的寄售库存协作效益研究

Study on Performance of Consignment Stock Cooperation Under Price-Sensitive Demand

针对单供应商和单购买商的二级供应链,通过数值方法,研究了完全信息及需求价格敏感情况下寄售库存(Consignment Stock,CS)协作对供应链系统收益的影响.假定供应商和购买商独立决策且完全理性,双方都力图使自己的收益最大化,在此基础上,双方最优的库存和定价策略将是Stackelberg博弈的结果,其中,供应商是领导者,购买商是追随者.结果表明,CS方式可以改善供应链协作,提高供应链系统效益,尤其是在价格弹性较小时,CS协作方式可以作为供应链协作的有效机制,而当价格弹性较大时,双方难以形成密切的伙伴关系.

In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of CS（consignment stock）cooperation on channel profits in simplified setting of a single-supplier, single-buyer supply chain with numerical methods. We assume that the information is symmetrical and the demand is deterministic but price-sensitive. The supplier and the buyer act independently and rationally, each maximizing their own respective profit. The equilibrium point that specifies the supplier＇ s and buyer＇ s inventory and pricing policy is determined by the solution to a Stackelberg game with the supplier acting as the leader and the buyer acting as the follower. The result of the study demonstrate that CS can improve the supply chain cooperation and channel profits especially when the sensitivity of demand to price changes is low which implies that only arms length relationship can gain in higher sensitivity of demand to price changes case.