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领导团体腐败和作弊的社会经济影响:数量特征与客观评价

Social and Economic Influence of Cheat(Corruption)Group Leadership:Quaitity Features and Objective Comment
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摘要 20世纪90年代以来,我国因领导团体作弊型腐败造成的经济和消费者福利损失迅速增加,其根本原因是行政权力对经济与市场的管制和干预,租金的来源主要是由政府控制引起的“公共区域”。学者们对我国租金价值计算表明,我国租金的绝对量有扩大的趋势,租金结构也发生了相应的变化。随着国家对经济活动管制的减少,租金的比例有降低的趋势。领导团体作弊型腐败不但扭曲了政府决策的合理性,并产生了严重的负外部性,且可能导致政府管理的失败,降低资源配置的效率和阻滞了国家的经济增长,最终影响到社会的稳定。官员腐败和作弊产生于制度的漏洞或不完善。制约与解决的有效手段是寻找能够适应生产力发展要求的新的制度安排。 Since 1990s, our country' s economic loss and the consumer' s welfare losses caused by leadership group corruption have increased rapidly. The fundamental reason is the control and interference of the administrative power over economy and market. The rent mainly comes from the “public area”caused by the govern- ment control. Researchers' calculation of China' s rent value shows that the magnitude of the rent has a trend of rise and that the structure of the rent has consequent changes. As the government diminishes its control over economic activities, the rate of the rent may show a trend of lowing down. Leadership group corruption not only warps the rationality of government decision - making, but creates negative outsidenes. What' s more, it will probably lead to the failure of government administration, diminishing the rate of resources distribution and impeding China' s economic growth, and have an negative effect on social stability in the end. Leadership corruption and leadership cheat are originated from loopholes and imperfection of the system. An efficient way to restrict the government and solve the problem is to search for a new system that meets the demands of the development of productivity.
出处 《湛江海洋大学学报》 CAS 2005年第5期40-45,共6页 Journal of Zhanjiang Ocean University
关键词 领导团体作弊 数量特征 社会影响 corruption of group leadership quantity feature social influence
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参考文献9

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