隐性保险、市场约束与我国银行业改革

Implicit Insurance,Market Discipline and the Reform of Banking in China

本文采用1994-2003年间我国14家商业银行的面板数据,在引入国家隐性保险虚拟变量后,通过估计银行存款增长率对其风险变化的反应的方式来测度市场约束,发现我国银行业的市场约束非常微弱,国家隐性保险不仅保护了国有银行,也包括其他所有的银行。这对我国银行业改革的启示在于,必须尽快取消国家隐性保险,建立符合国情的显性存款保险制度。

With a panel data of 14 commercial banks from1994 to 2003 in China and after introducing the dummy variable of official implicit insurance, this paper tests these hanks＇market discipline through their reflection of the real deposits growth rates to their risks and finds that the official implicit insurance not only covers the state - owned banks, but also all the other banks in China, which causes the weaker market discipline. The implication for the reform of the Chinese banking is that China should give up the official implicit insurance as early as possible and set up the explicit deposit insurance system suitable for Chinese situations.