软预算约束:无穷重复博弈视角

Soft Budget Constraint:An Infinitely Repeated Game's Perspective

本文在内生性软预算约束理论基础上,引入了无穷重复博弈,并指出在无穷重复博弈中,在一定约束条件下,银行可构造一项触发战略使企业的预算约束得到硬化。本文认为企业不能满足该约束条件是导致软预算约束的根本原因。

Based on the endogenous soft budget constraint theory, this paper introduces the infinitely repeated games into the Dewatripent- Maskin model. We then show that in the infinitely repeated games model, under certain condition, the bank can construct a trigger strategy, which will harden the enterprise＇s budget constraint. We argue that failing to meet the condition is an important cause for soft budget constraint.