政府在企业兼并与技术转让中的策略选择

The Government Strategies on Firm's in Merging.and Licensing

在Stackelberg竞争条件下,提高产品质量的技术转让与企业兼并之间存有如下关系:与技术转让相比,技术拥有企业总是偏好企业兼并,但是企业兼并会降低社会福利;就技术转让的形式而言,技术拥有企业绝不会选择固定收费方式,可是,因为特许权收费(或双重收费)方式既不能提高技术拥有企业的收益,也不能提高技术接受企业的收益,所以技术授权可能不会发生。但是,因为技术授权可以提高社会福利,所以政府应禁止企业兼并,并且干预企业的技术授权行为。

In this paper we develop a model where a higher- quality product firm competes with a lower- quality product firm in Stackelberg fashion. We compare licensing with merger. We find that although merger is better for the patent holder, it is welfare - reducing. Since fixed - fee licensing makes the patentee worse off, thus the patent holder never chooses such a licensing contract. Under royalty contact, it is possible that licensing does not occur. To improve social welfare, the government should force the patent holding firm to license its technology.