摘要
在现实市场中,公司经理人普遍存在着道德风险和逆向选择问题,为了尽可能地减少由此造成的代理成本,一个相当普遍的策略是对公司管理层实施薪酬激励政策。对中国上市公司管理层报酬—绩效敏感度的实证分析表明:上市公司管理层的报酬——绩效敏感度的离散程度非常高,没有明显的规律性和一致性;相当一部分上市公司的管理层报酬表现出“工资刚性”;公司绩效与管理层报酬——绩效敏感度之间不存在明显关联性。在重构中国企业高管薪酬体系的时候,对这些问题有必要慎重考虑。
In the realistic market, moral hazard and adverse selection are the prevalent problems for managers. For reducing the agent cost, a primary strategy is compensational incentives. The empirical analysis of listed companies shows that the dispersion of pay-performance sensitivity for executives is high, lacking obvious rules and alignments. Much compensation award for executives of listed companies presents wage rigidity. The relationship between the sensitivity and company＇s performance is not obvious. When restructuring the compensational incentives, the above problems should be carefully considered.
出处
《经济与管理》
2006年第1期59-61,共3页
Economy and Management
