论债务融资契约中的利益冲突及其治理

Conflicts of Interests in Debt Financing Contracts

债务融资常常被看作是缓解股权融资契约中利益冲突的有效手段,然而,债权融资契约本身又会引发股东和债权人之间的利益冲突,需要进行有效治理。债权人和股东之间的利益冲突可以分为两个层次:隐蔽的利益冲突和激发的利益冲突。如果债务融资契约是完全的,那么债权人就可以准确地预期到股东(债务人)所有可能采取的危及其利益的行为,从而就可以在签订融资契约时采取相应的保护措施,使得股东无法通过机会主义行为转嫁风险、侵害债权人的合法权益,从而实现最优的债务契约治理。但由于人的有限理性和未来事件的不确定性,人们不可能预见到未来事件的所有可能性状态,因而契约肯定是不完全的。当契约不完全时,许多利益冲突不可能在事前加以解决,相机控制权配置就成为治理债务契约中利益冲突的重要手段。

It is regarded that financing through debt issuance is an effective means to mitigate the conflicts of interests in equity financing. However, the debt financing contract itself may cause conflicts of interests between the shareholder and creditor. As to the conflicts of interests, some are implicit, some are obvious. If the debt financing contract is complete, the creditor can accurately expect the possible harmful behaviors from the shareholder or debtor. In this circumstance, they will adopt some safeguard while negotiating on the financing contract so that they can prevent the shareholder or debtor from hurting their benefits. But since the limited rationality of people and the uncertainty of future, we cannot foresee all possibilities. So, the contract is destined to be incomplete. As a result, many conflicts Of interests cannot be solved beforehand and the contingent allocation of rights of control rises to be an important solution to this problem.