论分析命题和综合命题——从蒯因到克里普克

On Analytical Propositions and Synthetical Propositions——From Quine to Kripke

蒯因打破了传统的分析命题和综合命题的区分;克里普克提出了“先验偶然命题”和“后验必然命题”的存在,打破了原来以为先验命题一定是必然的,后验命题一定是偶然的这种传统的观点,这个观点是对蒯因观点的发展。我们认为,蒯因的观点有一定合理性,但他忽视了逻辑真理作为分析命题与综合命题的区分;克里普克对先验偶然命题的和后验必然命题的论证与他的理论体系是融贯一致的,但他对严格指示词的证明是不充分的。当然,蒯因和克里普克观点的提出是分析哲学发展中的重要的里程碑,极大地推动了分析哲学在当代的发展。

Quine broke the traditional difference between the analytical propositions and the synthetical propositions, Kripke pointed out that there are the priori, contingent propositions and the posteriori, necessary propositions, and broke the traditional viewpoints that the priori propositions must be necessary and the posteriori propositions must be contingent. In fact. Kripke＇ viewpoints are the development related to Quine＇ s. We hold it that Quine＇s viewpoints are reasonable to a certain extent. Nevertheless, he ignored the difference between the logical truths as a sort of analytical propositions and the synthetical propositions. Kripke＇s demonstration on the priori and contingent propositions and the posteriori and necessary propositions is consistent with his system of theory, but we think the demonstration is inadequate that he made for the rigidly designating terms. Nevertbeless, the viewpoints of Quine and Kripke were important milestones in the history of analytical philosophy, which bring about o great advance in contemporary analytical philosophy.