政府监督与矿产业安全投入的经济分析

Economic analysis on government supervision and the input of safety facilities in the mining industry

中国矿业事故多发的根本原因在于政府监督不足导致的矿产业生产安全低投入。本文研究表明:一定水平的政府监督是诱导矿业企业安全投入的必要条件。在政府监督者与当地政府合二为一的背景下,政府监督的目标为税收收入与监督投入和矿业企业安全事故补偿支出之差的最大化;政府监督和矿业企业安全投入之间存在正向强化关系,但出于对自身税收收入的考虑,导致政府对矿业安全投入的监督不足;政府监督的缺失使得矿工意外事故补偿在诱导矿业企业安全投入中发挥重要作用。政府监督不足的制度性根源在于监督者的败德行为、委托代理关系错位和监督者激励不足等。因此,如何摆脱政府监督和矿业企业安全投入低水平均衡是破解中国矿业生产事故多发难题的关键。

The fundamental cause of frequent accidents in China＇s mining industry lies in that inadequate government supervision leads to low input in safety facilities. The study in the article shows that： government supervision at a certain level is necessary for guiding mining firms for safety input. The government aims at maximizing the gap between the revenue and supervision input and compensation for mining accidents. Government supervision has a positive relation with safety input. Considering the revenue, the government may take insufficient observation of safety input. The lack of government supervision makes compensation for mining accidents influence safety input decision of a mining firm. Inadequate government supervision is rooted in several aspects, such as some supervisors＇ moral degeneration, misplaced relation of entrusted agents, and insufficient incentives for supervisors. As result, the key to understand the puzzle of frequent accidents in the mining industry is to break the equilibrium between government supervision and low safety input by mining firms.