重读萨特:别一种伦理学

Reread Sartre: Another Moral

在《存在与虚无》与《伦理学笔记》中,萨特提出了另一种伦理学概念,这个概念来自长期以来的一种争论。萨特认为,道德问题是围绕下列问题展开的:即究竟什么是他人道德的哲学价值?换句话说,根据胡塞尔的现象学,萨特认为,人是自己所不是的东西或人不是他所是的东西,这就是关于人类本体论的道德真理。在他人问题上有某种道德旨趣,这主要表现在现象学意识和主体之间关系的结构上。萨特帮助我们理解了这样的问题:我们的经验在于我们自己并不处于反思的状态。在我们的日常生活中,我们发现自己所扮演的角色与我们的真实愿望没有多少关系,于是,我成为为他之人,而并没有忠实我自己的自由。

In Being and Nothingness and Nots on Morals, Jean- Baul Sartre presents another notion of morals, which is a source of some disputes. When Sartrc considers moral concept, the following questions arise： “Of what philosophical value is the other morality？” In other words, according to Husserl＇ s phenoinenology, Sartre considers “human reality is what it is not and is not what it is”as a moral truth about human ontology. There is something of moral interest in the notion of others, primarily due to what Sartre is attempting to present as being the constituents of phcnomenological consciousness and the intersubjectivity. Sartre helps us to understand the problem that our experience is that we are not ourselves at the point of reflection. In our everyday life, we find oumelves assuming roles that have little or nothing to do with our true desires. And therefore, I become a “man for others”instead of being true to my freedom.