制度变迁、银企关系和扭曲的杠杆治理

Institutional Changes, Relationship Banking and the Failed Governance Role of Debt

本文将我国商业银行改革划分为商业化、市场化和股份化三个阶段。通过使用负债水平在逐步市场化两个阶段治理水平较差。得到改善。本文问题，而银行股1994年到2003年的上市公司数据，我们发现我国上市公司的上升，但是企业盈利在不断下降。本文进而分析了在商业化和的银企关系。我们发现，借款较高的公司企业绩效较低，公司银行贷款和经理代理成本的协同关系在银行市场化时期并没有认为，现有的银行市场化举措没有能够从根本上解决银行坏账份化是值得考虑的理论选择。

This paper classifies the banking reforms of China into three periods, including commercialization, market adoption and ownership diversification. Using the data of China＇s public listed companies, we analyze the relationship between bank loans and corporate governance. It is found that with increasing the sizes of bank loans, managerial agency costs increase and corporate performance decreases. The facilitator role of debt in managerial exploitation of corporate wealth has not been changed without reforms of property rights. We also find that the leverage ratios keep increasing, but return on assets keep decreasing in these Chinese firms from 1994 to 2003. Therefore, the reforms before ownership diversification did not succeed in fundamentally dealing with the problem of bad loans.