电信竞争、呼叫外部性与接听方付费

Telecommunication Competition,Call Externality and Receiver-Pays Principle

本文扩展了Joen—Laffont—Tirole（2002）文章的模型，考察了在呼叫方与接听方合作决定通话长度条件下电信运营商的竞争策略。当引入接听方付费和呼叫外部性的假设进入电信竞争模型时，在线性定价条件下，电信运营商制定的呼叫价格与接听价格仍然随着网络替代程度的增加而减少，但是电信运营商不再能够利用接入费来进行合谋。在非线性定价条件下，电信运营商竞争策略是制定使消费者剩余最大化的呼叫价格与接听价格，然后利用固定费榨取消费者剩余。在基于网络的价格歧视条件下，与Joen—Laffont-Tirole（2002）模型相比较，由于通话时间由消费者合作决定。因此电信运营商将通过固定费进行市场份额的争夺，从而导致按边际成本定价。网络联接并没有因为电信运营商的竞争策略而发生中断。

This paper extends the Joen-Laffont-Tirole＇s model and investigates telecommunication operators＇ competitive strategies when caller and receiver cooperate to decide the length of call. With call externality and receiver-pays principle, call price and reception charge still increase with the substitutability of two networks under linear pricing, but access charge is not an instrument of tacit collusion. Under nonlinear tariffs, call price and reception charge maximize consumer surplus and carriers use the fixed fee to extract all consumer surplus. In contrast with the JoenLaffont-Tirole＇s model, telecommunication operators will compete for market shares by the fixed charge under network-based price discrimination because the caller and the receiver cooperatively decide the length of call. Operators＇strategies result in the cost-based pricing and network connectivity remains.