摘要
金融开放必然带来外国银行的进入。与外国银行相比,本国银行所拥有的私人信息可以带来对借款人的有效锁定。我们的模型指出,在这种情况下,(1)本国银行就会对信贷进行重新安排,以使更多的信贷流向那些被锁定的借款人;(2)如果借款人的资质和它的被锁定程度高度相关,不知情银行(外国银行)的竞争会使知情银行(本国银行)的贷款组合趋向恶化。
Finance market liberation must lead to the entry of foreign banks. Private information obtained by local banks leads to borrower capture. In this case, a model constructed by us argues: First, when faced with greater competition from outside lenders, banks reallocate credit toward more captured borrowers. Second, if borrower quality and captivity are sufficiently correlated, an increase in the competitiveness of uninformed lenders( foreign banks ) can lead to a worsening of the informed lender' s ( local banks) overall loan portfolio.
出处
《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第2期17-20,共4页
Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
关键词
信息不对称
锁定
资质
信贷安排
Asymmetric Information
Capture
Quality
Loan Portfolio Allocation