3G背景下电信竞争模型与接入规制政策研究

Telecommunication Competition Modes and Access Pricing Regulation under 3G

3G正在重组我国的电信产业组织,同时对电信运营商商业竞争模式的变革提出要求。本文构建3G背景下电信竞争模型,分析垄断运营商的网络规模决策及网络竞争的福利效应,并对电信接入定价决策及接入规制政策进行分析。本文的主要结论是:垄断运营商缺乏提供普遍服务的激励;在网络规模非对等下,引入电信竞争通常是社会低效率的;在位者提供瓶颈资源的接入定价是社会低效率的,可以采用基于机会成本的有效元素定价对接入服务予以规制。

The telecommunication industry is being restructured with the coming of 3G, and the competition modes for companies in telecom industry have to be reorganized to match up 3G. By establishing the competition model for telecom companies under 3G, this paper analyzes the access pricing problem and discusses the regulatory issues. The main findings in this paper are： First, a monopoly phone network didn＇t serve all the potential users ; second, incompatible networks are always social inefficient unless the two networks have equal network size; finally, the profit maximizing access price is certainly above the first best level, and ECPR pricing rule could be used to guide the access pricing.