期刊文献+

特许经营的理论分析:交易费用和生产成本的观点 被引量:6

On the Theoretical Analysis of Franchise: Viewpoint of Transaction Cost and Cost of Manufacture
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摘要 作为一种现代化的流通方式和组织形式,特许经营极大地促进了现代商业的发展。但在理论上,特许经营并没有得到详细、系统的阐述。本文从交易费用出发,对特许经营的理论进行了分析研究,并从生产成本的角度对交易费用理论进行了补充。最后,在综合考虑生产成本和交易费用的基础上,对特许经营的规模经济和成本优势进行了阐述。 As modem cireulating mode and organizing form, franchise has deeply promoted the development of modern commerce. But in theory, it is not expatiated in detail and systematically. This paper gives theoretical analysis and research of franchise from the point of transaction cost, and complements the transaction cost theory by the cost of manufacture. In the end, franchise's economy of scale and cost advantage is set forth on the basis of general consideration of both transaction cost and cost of manufacture.
出处 《价值工程》 2006年第2期91-95,共5页 Value Engineering
关键词 特许经营 理论分析 变易费用 生产成本 交易费用理论 成本优势 规模经济 现代化 流通 商业 franchise theoretical analysis transaction cost cost of manufacture
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参考文献10

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二级参考文献15

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共引文献35

同被引文献34

引证文献6

二级引证文献10

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