期刊文献+

商业银行债权人委员会运行机制问题研究 被引量:6

Operational Mechanism for Creditors' Committee for Commercial Banks
下载PDF
导出
摘要 本文介绍了商业银行债权人委员会制度的概念、主要作用及产生原因,比较分析了国内外商业银行债权人委员会制度的产生发展和主要区别,从粤海、APP、德隆、三九、啤酒花债务重组的实践入手,剖析了当前我国商业银行债权人委员会制度运行的主要实践、困难、原因、经验和教训,得出以下基本结论:我国的商业银行债权人委员会制度尽管在法律环境、制度安排和具体操作方面存在很多的不足,但确实已成为商业银行处理重大企业债务危机的一个现实选择,并将成为市场化、法制化、规范化处置企业债务危机的一种新趋势。本文也针对存在的问题与不足,给出了完善我国商业银行债权人委员会制度的相关政策建议。 In the present paper, the system of creditors' committee of commercial banks is introduced in terms of the concept, functions and origin. Comparison is made on the development of and difference between domestic and foreign system of creditors' committee for commercial banks. Based on the debt restructuring of Yuehai, APP, Delong, Sanjiu and Pijiuhua, analysis is made of the operations, problems, cause, experience/lessons in the system of creditors' committee of Chinese commercial banks at work. Conclusion is drawn that: although there is much to be desired in legal environment, system arrangement and practice, the said system has become an applicable alternative to handle importance enterprise debt crisis and will be a new trend to deal with enterprise debt crisis with marketized, legalized and standardized approaches. Policy suggestions of improvement are given in relation to the problems and loopholes in the system in our country.
作者 陆胜东
出处 《金融论坛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第12期33-40,共8页 Finance Forum
关键词 商业银行 风险管理 资产保全 债权人委员会制度 委员会制度 制度运行 债权人 机制问题 债务危机 债务重组 commercial banks risk management asset maintenance the system of creditors' commission
  • 相关文献

参考文献9

二级参考文献16

  • 1J Atgenti, 1976.Corporate Collapse: The Cause and Symptoms. McGraw-Hill, New York.
  • 2Subhash Sharma, Vijay Mahajan, 1980. Early Warning Indicators of Business Failure. Journal of Marketing, Vol.44, Fall.
  • 3W H Beaver, 1966. Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure. Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement to Vol.5.
  • 4Altman, E. I. A further empirical investigation of the bankruptcy cost question [J]. Journal of Finance, 1984, (39):1067.
  • 5Andrade, G. and S. N. Kaplan. How costly is financial (not economic) distress? Evidence from highly leveraged transactions that became distressed [J]. Journal of Finance, 1998, (53):1443.
  • 6Baxter, N. Leverage, risk of ruin and the cost of capital[J]. Journal of Finance, 1967, (22):395.
  • 7Kaplan, S. The effects of management buyouts on operations and value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989, (24):217.
  • 8Warner, J. Bankruptcy costs: some evidence[J]. Journal of Finance, 1977, (32):337.
  • 9Wruck, K. H. Financial distress, reorganization, and organizational efficiency[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, (27):419.
  • 10.根据Kaplan和Stein(1993)的研究,1985年以后完成的管理层收购(MBO)事件中,超过30%以上出现债务违约[Z].,..

共引文献47

引证文献6

二级引证文献17

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部