城市房屋拆迁视角下的地方政府权重与约束

Local Governments′ Weight and Restrains from the Perspective of Urban Building Relocation

运用多人合作博弈理论并结合委托代理理论对中国城市房屋拆迁这一运行系统进行研究,可以发现政府在这一系统中具有完全的势力。地方政府短期利益驱动加剧了开发商和建筑单位对被拆迁人利益的损害;由于缺乏公信力,发生纠纷后被拆迁人往往拒绝选择行政裁决方式;现行体制下司法机关在人事和经费上对地方政府的过度依赖,使其只能机械地按照地方政府的规定判决,或者是拒绝受理有关拆迁的诉讼;被拆迁人在博弈中的缺位且“申诉无门”,使坚持维权者只能通过消极反叛演化为“钉子户”的方式来表达意愿。据此,应该加强对地方政府的司法约束。

This paper analyzes the urban building relocation operating system of China by applying cooperation-game theory and principal-agent theory, and concluded that governments has absolutely dominated power in this system. The short-run interests behind local governments aggravated damages caused by the construction developers and units to the benefits of dwellers. Due to the lack of public trust, the relocated dwellers usually refuse to select administrative ruling after the disputes. Because the judicial departments rely heavily on local governments in terms of personnel and financial resources under the current system, which results in the fact that the judicial departments only passively abide by the ruling made by local governments, or deny dealing with lawsuits related to relocations; Absence of relocated dwellers in this game and no way to file a complaint force the defenders to express their willingness only through their passive protests, and in turn ＂iron dwellers＂. Based on these issues, this paper gives some proposals to strengthen the judicial restrains on local governments.