摘要
职业经理人价值大小取决于经理人的个人潜能、投资者边际努力程度以及最低边际收益值.投资者用于职业经理人信息搜索和监督方面的成本最低时,投资者对职业经理人能力的基本预期仅为其潜能的一半,而当潜能的发挥正好等于个人能力意愿的发挥时,职业经理人的价值最大.企业要达到这一境地,必须塑造一种有效的激励机制,股票期权就是其中较为明智的抉择,而行权时机的合理选择又可为职业经理人价值的实现带来显著的效果.
The value of a professional manager is determined by managerial potential, investor's marginal effort, and minimum of marginal earnings. The lower the capitalist's cost applied on information search and superintendence, the less investor's expectation to managerial capacity. While potential usage is just the same as that of personal willing, the value of a professional manager is at maximum. To fulfill the aim, the capitalist should establish an efficient incentive system. One of the incentive methods is stock's option whose reasonable selection may be significant for the realization of the value of professional managers.
出处
《湖北工业大学学报》
2005年第6期37-41,共5页
Journal of Hubei University of Technology
关键词
职业经理人
价值模型
激励模式
行权时机
professional manager
value function
incentive mode
option's performance opportunity