行动性、因果与意图

Agency, Causality and Intention

如何描述行动性(agency)是行动哲学的中心课题,寻找行动性的哲学分析与逻辑表达是许多研究者的重要任务。本文概括了有关行动性的主要理论,特别讨论它与因果性的关系,以及相应的逻辑表达形式。在此基础上,我们指出了其中存在的困难与不足。为此,一个改进的尝试方案被提出:它以Searle的行动中的意图为哲学基础,以动态逻辑为主要逻辑表达手段。此外,本文还比较了我们的方案与其它行动性理论的异同,同时指出了值得进一步探讨的方向。

How to describe agency is the center topic. It is the tasks of many studies to seek to give philosophical analyses and logical expressions for agency. This paper includes a few of main theories about agency, which is closely related with causality, and shows their own semantics, mostly in possible world frame respectively. However, there are some problems induced by them, so a new treatment for previous theories will advance discussion of agency, if we adopt the Intention-in-action from Searle's notations in philosophical aspect, and at the same time, dynamic logic with plan as logic toots. Finally, this paper compares my investigation with others and suggests some further issues.